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Demand for Off-Grid Solar Electricity:  
Experimental Evidence from Rwanda 
Michael Grimm, Luciane Lenz, Jörg Peters, and Maximiliane Sievert 
Abstract 
The cost of providing electricity to the unconnected 1.1 billion people in developing countries is 
significant. High hopes are pinned on market-based dissemination of off-grid technologies to 
complement the expensive extension of public grid infrastructure. In this paper, we elicit the revealed 
willingness-to-pay for different off-grid solar technologies in a field experiment in rural Rwanda. Our 
findings show that households are willing to dedicate substantial parts of their budget to electricity, but 
not enough to reach cost-covering prices. Randomly assigned payment periods do not alter this finding. 
We interpret the results from two perspectives. First, we examine whether the United Nations’ universal 
energy access goal can be reached via unsubsidized markets. Second, in a stylized welfare cost-benefit 
analysis, we compare a subsidization policy for off-grid solar electrification to a grid extension policy. 
Our findings suggest that, for most of rural Africa, off-grid solar is the preferable technology to reach 
mass electrification, and that grid infrastructure should concentrate on selected prosperous regions. 
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Demand for Off-Grid Solar Electricity:  
Experimental Evidence from Rwanda 
Michael Grimm, Luciane Lenz, Jörg Peters, and Maximiliane Sievert∗ 
1. Introduction 
Universal electricity access is a primary goal of the international community. The 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and the United Nations’ initiative ‘Sustainable 
Energy for All’ (SE4All) call for connecting the 1.1 billion people worldwide hitherto 
lacking electricity access by 2030. Yet, the contribution of electricity to economic 
development is unclear. It is beyond discussion that the economic transition in 
industrialized countries would not have been possible without electrification. However, 
the right timing of electrification in developing countries, particularly in remote and 
sparsely populated areas, is under debate, given modest short-term impacts and high 
investment costs. For Asian and Latin American countries, Lipscomb et al. (2013), Rud 
(2012), van de Walle et al. (2016), and Khandker et al. (2013) find positive effects on 
various socio-economic outcomes. For Africa, in contrast, it is less clear whether 
electrification triggers massive economic development (Bernard 2012; Chaplin et al. 
2017; Dinkelman 2011; Lenz et al. 2017; Peters and Sievert 2016). At the same time, the 
cost of electrification is substantial. OECD/IEA estimates that, for Africa alone, the 
investment requirements to achieve universal access by 2030 are at 19 billion USD 
                                                 
∗ Michael Grimm, University of Passau, Erasmus University Rotterdam and IZA. Luciane Lenz and 
Maximiliane Sievert, RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research. Corresponding author: Jörg Peters, 
RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, University of Passau, and University of Passau. Mailing 
address: RWI, Hohenzollenstraße 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany. E-mail: peters@rwi-essen.de. Phone: ++49-
201-8149-237. 
Acknowledgements: Data collection underlying this research was financially supported by the Centre for 
Development Research in Bonn (ZEF) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ). Lenz, Peters, and Sievert gratefully acknowledge the support of a special grant 
(Sondertatbestand) from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy and the Ministry 
of Innovation, Science, and Research of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia. The authors thank Anicet 
Munyehirwe and IB&C Rwanda for the implementation of the field work. Cyndi Berck, Chiara Kofol, 
Frank Otchere, and Ferdinand Rauch, as well as participants at the Environment for Development (EfD) 
annual meeting in Shanghai, the Sustainable Energy Transition Initiative (SETI) annual meeting at Duke 
University, the CSAE Conference in Oxford, and research seminar participants at the World Bank 
Development Research Group seminar in Washngton D.C., at University of the Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg, ETH Zurich, University of Göttingen, University of Marburg, University of Groningen, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, the ZEF Bonn and the Development Network Berlin workshop provided 
valuable comments and suggestions. All correspondence to: Jörg Peters, RWI, Hohenzollenstraße 1-3, 
45128 Essen, Germany, e-mail: peters@rwi-essen.de, phone: ++49-201-8149-237. 
Environment for Development Grimm et al. 
 
2 
annually (IEA 2011; World Development Indicators 2014), which corresponds to almost 
45 percent of the yearly official development assistance influx to the continent.  
Only recently, researchers have started questioning whether public funds should 
be used to subsidize mass electrification. Especially in developing countries, the tight 
governmental budgets are up against various underfinanced public services, such as 
transport, health and education infrastructure, and thus opportunity costs are high. This is 
prominently illustrated by Lee et al. (2016), who randomized different connection fees 
across villages in Western Kenya to obtain households’ revealed Willingness-to-Pay 
(WTP) for grid access. Because the WTP they observe covers only a small part of the 
required cost, they suggest that electrification creates a ‘welfare loss’ ranging between 
540 and 1,100 USD per household. Lee et al. (2016) acknowledge that a revealed WTP is 
constrained in a context of imperfect capital markets, as people cannot easily access 
credit to finance connection costs. Moreover, it is likely that a revealed WTP reflects only 
internalized benefits. Yet, the authors implicitly argue that non-internalized private and 
social benefits are unlikely to justify subsidies on this order of magnitude. 
In the present paper, we complement Lee et al. (2016) by studying the revealed 
WTP for three different off-grid solar technologies. SE4All as well as the SDGs include 
off-grid solar as one pillar of their multi-tier definition of modern energy. While Lee et 
al. (2016) provide novel insights on the demand for electrification at the upper bound of 
the technological spectrum, the present paper is to the best of our knowledge the first to 
study demand for electrification at the lower bound.  
Investment costs for the devices we offered vary between 13 and 182 USD. 
Unlike on-grid electrification, off-grid electricity does not require large-scale 
infrastructure investments, including power plants and transmission lines. At the same 
time, service levels are lower for off-grid than for on-grid connections. The solar kits 
used in this paper allow for different energy usage levels starting from just one task light 
to several lighting sources, mobile phone charging, and radio usage. They cannot power 
high-wattage appliances like machinery, electric stoves, fridges, or irons.1 This can 
become a bottleneck for productivity development in some places. Even in grid-covered 
areas, though, demand patterns in many parts of rural Africa can also be fulfilled by off-
                                                 
1 For the sake of clarity, we ignore decentralized mini-grids that are powered by solar, wind, hydro, or 
diesel generators. Depending on their scale, they allow for higher power services, but incur high upfront 
investment costs for distribution lines as well as generation and storage capacities. Our argument is robust 
to the inclusion of mini-grids, since their cost structure is similar to the Lee et al. (2016) cost estimates, 
which include only transformers and distribution lines.  
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grid solar, because electricity is virtually never used for cooking or refrigeration in 
households, and because machinery usage in enterprises is also very rare (see, for 
example, Chaplin et al. 2017; Lenz et al. 2017; and Peters et al. 2011). 
Using a sample of 324 randomly selected households in 16 remote and poor off-
grid communities spread across rural Rwanda, we elicit the WTP for three different types 
of off-grid solar – a 0.5 Watt, a 3.3 Watt, and a 20 Watt device – using a Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak real-purchase offer bidding game. In addition, each household was 
randomly assigned to a payment period of seven days, six weeks, or five months in order 
to test for the effect of a zero-interest rate credit scheme on the WTP.  
We find that the average WTP for the three solar kits is between 38 and 55 
percent of their respective market prices. Even at the upper tail of the income distribution, 
few households are able and willing to pay amounts that come close to the market prices. 
This observation is in line with the broader literature on the adoption of socially desirable 
technologies. In recent years, many studies have shown, in particular for health-relevant 
products, that demand is highly price elastic (see Cohen and Dupas 2010; Dupas 2014; 
Tarozzi et al. 2014; Kremer and Miguel 2007; Mobarak et al. 2012). The similarity 
between these technologies and electricity is that benefits are not fully internalized and 
policy therefore intervenes to facilitate adoption. This branch of literature strongly 
advocates ‘cost-sharing’ dissemination strategies, i.e., subsidized end-user prices to bring 
adoption rates to a socially desirable level (Bates et al. 2012).   
SE4All and most programs that subscribe to it pursue a market-based paradigm, 
expecting the target group to pay cost-covering prices for off-grid solar technologies. 
While the affordability problems of the poor are well known, the hypothesis is typically 
that people’s WTP is high enough but is constrained by a lack of liquidity. However, we 
find that relaxing this liquidity constraint from a seven-day payment period to either six 
weeks or five months increases the WTP for any of the kits by 12 percent at most. 
Accounting for interest rates that are typically high in rural areas shows that this increase 
in WTP is not enough to cover capital costs and overheads that would be associated with 
a credit-based financing scheme. We thereby also contribute to the literature on liquidity 
constraints and technology adoption in poor settings (see, for example, Beltramo et al. 
2015, Yishay et al. 2016, Devoto et al. 2012, Tarozzi et al. 2014, and Yoon et al. 2016).  
We then interpret our findings from two perspectives. In the SE4All angle, we 
examine whether households in poor and remote areas – a considerable part of the 1.1 
billion without electricity – can afford to pay cost-covering prices for off-grid solar. In 
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the Social Planner’s angle, we ask whether a full subsidization policy would be desirable 
from a welfare-oriented public policy perspective. 
Our findings in the SE4All angle suggest that the vast majority of the rural poor 
will not be able to pay cost-covering prices for off-grid solar technologies. The United 
Nations’ SE4All initiative and the World Bank’s Lighting Global platform, the flagship 
program for off-grid solar energy, promote the distribution of off-grid electricity without 
end-user subsidies through the private market (see Lighting Global 2016). M-Kopa and 
d.light are two examples of successful solar companies with high sales numbers in 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia (Lighting Global 2016). Our findings do not challenge the 
approaches of these pioneers in certain better-off strata of those countries, but emphasize 
that market-based approaches will have difficulties in reaching the poorer populations in 
rural Africa and, correspondingly, the SE4All goal of universal electricity access. 
In the Social Planner’s angle, we conduct a back-of-the-envelope welfare 
assessment of a subsidization policy. We find that the internalized benefits, as reflected in 
the WTP, do not cover the costs of off-grid solar electrification and hence subsidization 
leaves an internal return on investment gap. The gaps range between 8 and 85 USD per 
household for the different technologies and are considerably lower than what Lee et al. 
(2016) observed for on-grid electrification. In a next step, we discuss the benefits of off-
grid solar electricity that might not be reflected in WTP, most notably long-term benefits 
and external effects. From a welfare perspective, a full subsidization would be justified if 
these benefits are high enough to close the internal return on investment gap. We provide 
a brief review of the literature and show that the evidence on the effects of small off-grid 
solar is generally positive, yet there is no indication for a transformative development 
effect. Nonetheless, although external effects of off-grid solar are certainly lower than for 
on-grid electricity in absolute terms, in relative terms they are likely to cover larger parts 
of the internal return on investment gap, due to the high cost of grid extension. We 
therefore conclude that, if mass electrification is a political goal, off-grid solar is the 
preferable technology for large parts of rural and poor Africa. At least for the next two 
decades, high-cost grid infrastructure investments should concentrate on selected 
prosperous areas with high business potential. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present 
SE4All and briefly discuss energy access policy in Africa, as well as the country 
background. Section 3 describes our methodological approach and our data. In Section 4, 
we present our main results on the WTP, on the impacts of the payment periods, and on 
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the difficulty in collecting instalment payment. Section 5 interprets our findings from the 
SE4ALL angle and the Social Planner’s angle. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background 
2.1. Policy Background 
For most African governments, grid extension is the most obvious intervention to 
increase access to electricity and to reach the SE4ALL goal. However, in recent years, 
decentralized solar technologies have gained importance as a lower-cost alternative, in 
particular because production costs of panels, storage systems, and LEDs have decreased 
considerably. Since 2009, the World Bank program ‘Lighting Global’ has supported the 
international off-grid lighting market for products of up to 10 Watts. The so-called pico-
solar products promoted by this program provide different basic energy services 
depending on the panel size, such as lighting, radio, and mobile phone charging. Larger 
off-grid solar products, typically referred to as solar home systems (SHS), are 
additionally able to run TV sets and comparable devices, but not high-wattage devices 
(e.g., fridges) and appliances running on alternating current.   
In the absence of electricity, people in rural Sub-Saharan Africa light their homes 
using traditional lighting sources – kerosene-driven wick and hurricane lamps or candles. 
Additionally, dry cell battery-driven LED lamps have become available in recent years in 
almost every rural shop and are increasingly used (see Bensch et al. 2017). Some 
households in rural areas resort to only the dim light emitted by the cooking fire. For 
many households, expenditures on kerosene and batteries constitute a considerable part of 
their total expenditures. This level of baseline lighting consumption is an important factor 
for the decision to invest in a solar kit, since it determines the replaceable expenditures 
and thus the cash flow expectations.  
Lighting Global’s approach assumes that off-grid solar products will make their 
way into households through the market. The program has introduced a quality 
verification system and supports manufacturers and retailers in overcoming information 
asymmetries that might prevent customers from buying the products. Credit constraints 
are supposed to be eased via credit and smart payment systems such as the Pay-as-you-go 
mechanism (PAYG), which allows customers to pay for the kit in small installments, 
often via mobile money. An additional innovative feature that can be combined with 
PAYG is to lock the solar kit remotely in case of non-payment, through an installed 
microchip connected to the mobile phone network. Generally, Lighting Global opposes 
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direct end-user subsidies. According to Lighting Global (2016), around 4.3 million pico-
solar kits were sold in Africa, with sales concentrating in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania. 
Customers so far are mostly somewhat better-off households. It is important to emphasize 
that, in addition to the branded and quality-verified products promoted by Lighting 
Global, non-quality verified (i.e., non-branded) solar products are available virtually 
everywhere in rural Africa (see Bensch et al. 2016; Grimm and Peters 2016; Lighting 
Global 2016). 
The link between Lighting Global and SE4All is established by the Global 
Tracking Framework and its multi-tier system (SE4All 2013), which defines what type of 
electricity supply qualifies as modern energy. For example, a regular connection to the 
national grid qualifies as Tier 3 or 4, because it allows for using lighting, a television, and 
a fan all day. An SHS qualifies for Tier 1 or 2 depending on its capacity. Tier 1 requires 
providing access to a peak capacity of at least 1 Watt and basic energy services 
comprising a task light and a charger for radios or phones. Most solar products promoted 
by Lighting Global, as well as two of the three kits used in this study, qualify for Tier 1. 
Our smallest kit is just a tad below the Tier 1 threshold (because it includes only a lamp 
and lacks a phone charger; see Section 3.1.). There is a wide spread between the service 
qualities and costs of the different tiers; the retail price of the smallest pico-solar kit used 
in this study is around 13 USD.2 For comparison, the World Bank (2009) estimates a cost 
range for on-grid electrification in rural areas of 730 to 1450 USD per connection, which 
is confirmed by Lee et al. (2016) for the case of Kenya and by Lenz et al. (2017) for 
Rwanda. Chaplin et al. (2017) provide evidence of how sensitive connection costs are to 
population density and connection rates; for Tanzania, they observe connection costs as 
high as 6,600 USD per household, and note that only 20 percent of households in the 
target region get connected.  
2.2. Country Background 
The Government of Rwanda sees electrification as a priority to reach its poverty 
reduction goals (see MININFRA 2016). Rwanda’s energy sector is undergoing an 
extensive transition, in which electricity provision plays a dominating role. It is the 
government’s objective to increase the electrification rate to 70 percent by 2018 and to 
full coverage by 2020. The key policy instrument is the huge Electricity Access Roll-Out 
                                                 
2 We use the official exchange rate in April 2016 for conversion, i.e., 100 Rwandan Franc (RWF) = 0.13 
USD. 
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Program (EARP), which increased the national connection rate from 6 to 24 percent 
country-wide between 2009 and 2015. While EARP Phase I relied on grid electrification 
only, half of the Phase II connections are scheduled to be provided via decentralized 
technologies (SE4All 2014), including SHS and pico-solar kits (MININFRA 2016). More 
recently, the so-called Bye Bye Agatadowa initiative has attracted some attention, with its 
aim of eliminating kerosene lamps completely from the country by facilitating access to 
pico-solar. In the African context, this engagement of the government is extraordinary. 
Note that the communities sampled for this study have not yet been reached by these 
activities and no concrete plan for electricity-related roll-out has been announced for the 
near future. In that respect, they resemble typical off-grid areas in Africa (see Section 3). 
3. Research Approach and Data  
We conducted a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) among 324 randomly 
selected households in 16 rural communities in Rwanda and elicited the WTP for three 
different solar kits using a real-purchase offer game based on the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) mechanism. Each household was visited individually and was offered 
the three solar kits. It is important to emphasize that the three kits were offered 
sequentially, starting with Kit 1 and followed by Kit 2 and 3. For the payment, each 
household was randomly assigned a payment period of either one week, six weeks, or 
five months. This randomization of payment periods was stratified at the community 
level. In this section, we first briefly describe the three solar technologies that were 
offered, followed by the sampling process and the bidding game to elicit the WTP.  
3.1. Off-Grid Technologies Offered in Bidding Game 
We cooperated with a pico-solar vendor and selected three kits out of his product 
range that he offered in Kigali and on some rural markets. Table 1 presents the three 
types. The most basic kit is the d.light S2 (“Kit 1”), an LED lamp with an integrated 
small solar panel. It provides only lighting and thus does not reach Tier 1 in the SE4ALL 
multi-tier metric. The second kit offered is the Sun King Pro 2 (“Kit 2”), which is 
borderline eligible for Tier 1 because it provides lighting and phone or radio charging via 
two USB ports. Kits 1 and 2 are portable and can be used as a desk lamp or attached to a 
wall or the ceiling. Both kits are quite similar to other (borderline) Tier 1 pico-solar kits 
available on the market in Rwanda and elsewhere in Africa (see GOGLA 2016). The 
third kit offered, the ASE 20W Solar DC Lighting Kit (“Kit 3”), is a SHS, i.e. the solar 
panel is installed outside and charges a separate battery, which in turn is connected to 
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four LED lamps and a charging station with six USB ports. Kit 3 and its 20 W panel still 
qualify as Tier 1. It is a small SHS compared to other systems available on the market, 
but it comes close to Tier 2 in terms of the variety of electricity services. The market 
prices of the three kits vary considerably, between 13 USD for Kit 1 and 182 USD for Kit 
3. According to the solar vendor, the expected lifetime is three years for Kit 1, six years 
for Kit 2 and four years for Kit 3. Note that the Kit 3 lifetime estimate, in particular, is 
very conservative. In general, the lifetime of comparable SHS is on the order of 8 to 12 
years, but depends on usage patterns and intensity, replacement of components, cleaning 
of the panel, and environmental conditions (temperature, wind, dust, and humidity).  
Table 1. Specifications of Solar Technologies 
 Kit 1 Kit 2 Kit 3 
 
   
Model d.light Design S 2 
Greenlight Planet Inc. 
Sun King Pro 2 
ASE  
20W Solar DC Lighting Kit 
Full battery run time1 
(in hours) 6.5 5.9 - 13.1
2 4 – 363 
Total light output per kit 
(in lumens) 25 81 – 160
2 220 
Panel size (in Watts) 0.5 3.3 20 
Features 1 LED lamp  
1 LED lamp, 
2 USB ports, 
3 brightness settings 
4 LED lamps, 
6 USB ports, 
Separate battery of 14Ah 
SE4ALL multi-tier 
classification Tier 0 Tier 1 Tier 1 
Approximate market price 
in Rwanda 
13 USD  
(10,000 FRW) 
37 USD  
(29,000 FRW) 
 182 USD 
(140,000 FRW) 
Life span4  3 years 6 years 4 years 
1 Run time estimates do not include mobile phone charging; 2 depending on the brightness setting;                
3 depending on the number of lamps in use. Sources: https://www.lightingglobal.org, Dassy Enterprise 
Rwanda; Pictures: Brian Safari, IB&C; 4According to manufacturer specification. 
3.2. Sampling 
We used a two-stage sampling approach on the community level and the 
household level. We selected survey communities so that they resemble typical target 
regions of solar technologies and used four selection criteria:  
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(i) Communities are not expected to be connected to the grid in the near future. 
(ii) Areas exhibit appropriate solar radiation levels (see Figure 1). 
(iii) Communities are not exposed to systematic marketing activities of solar 
product companies and comparable products are not available in the villages 
or nearby villages. This reduces the risk of preconceived price ideas, which 
could lead to strategic bidding in our bidding game. As we will see later, it is 
impossible to preclude exceptional households from having access to off-grid 
solar via charities or relatives and friends in urban areas.  
(iv) Communities are not adjacent. This prevents communication between survey 
participants from different communities.  
We followed a two-stage sampling process, consisting of non-random community 
selection, and subsequent random household sampling. First, we obtained a list of 
communities (so-called imudugudu) from the Rwandan government that all met the 
criteria outlined above, and verified the government’s assessment via phone with local 
authorities at the cell level3. Based on these criteria, we compiled a list of eligible 
communities and then drew 16 out of these, distributed across 11 sectors in three out of 
five Rwandan provinces (see Figure 1). In a second step, we chose 324 households 
through simple random sampling on the community level on the day of the field visits. 
Because not all communities and households were equally accessible, the sample is not 
equally distributed across communities and sectors (see Figure 1). Households could not 
self-select into participation. 
The selection procedure resulted in communities with an average size of 178 
households and 847 people. The communities are quite remote, located on average 14 km 
from the nearest main road, which is a considerable distance for mountainous Rwanda. 
Public infrastructure is available only in a few communities; this includes primary 
schools (in five communities), health centers (in one community), and weekly markets (in 
five communities). Only two of 14 community chiefs interviewed expect their 
community to be connected to the national electricity grid in the near future. 
In line with our selection criteria, communities are not exposed to systematic 
promotion of solar products. Off-grid solar products comparable to our Kit 1 and Kit 2 
                                                 
3 Rwanda is divided into five administrative levels, including provinces, districts, sectors, cells, and 
imudugudu. 416 sectors cover 2,148 cells, of which each covers on average seven imudugudu (see National 
Institute of Rwanda 2008).  
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are not available in local shops. Only around half of the communities had some exposure 
to NGO-led marketing activities of larger SHS. As we show later, the technology is not 
completely new to the population, but adoption rates of solar products before the study 
were low (41 households) and prices were unknown (see Section 4.1). 
Figure 1. Sectors Surveyed and Global Horizontal Irradiation Levels 
 
Note: Crosses indicate the sectors surveyed, which contain between one and two surveyed imudugudu. The 
sample size surveyed per sector is in parentheses. Source: Own illustration based on SolarGIS Solar 
Radiation Map for Rwanda. 
3.3. Survey Implementation and the Real-Purchase Offer Game  
The survey was implemented between August and November 2015 in cooperation 
with Inclusive Business and Consultancy (IB&C), a Kigali-based consultancy, Rwanda 
Energy Group (REG), Rwanda’s public energy agency, and Dassy Enterprise, a Kigali-
based Rwandan company that markets branded solar products.  
For the household interviews, the financial decision maker was called and 
informed that we would sell a solar kit following a sales procedure different from what is 
usually known in the market. All sampled households were asked for their consent to be 
interviewed and to participate in the bidding game, but were not informed about the 
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research purpose or the experimental character of the study, i.e., the randomization of the 
payment periods. Hence, typical survey effects might occur, but Hawthorne effects are 
unlikely. Enumerators worked in parallel within one community to avoid communication 
between participating households. Figure 2 presents the participant flow, which 
highlights our sequential procedure in the field. 
Figure 2. Participant Flow 
 
The enumerator demonstrated the three solar kits to each household consecutively 
and offered the opportunity to bid for each one using the auction procedure described 
below. The process started with Kit 1, followed by Kit 2, and lastly Kit 3. When Kit 1 
was offered, the household was not yet aware of the Kit 2 and 3 offers. Before Kit 2 was 
offered, the participants were told that they can only purchase one kit, and asked to 
decide which kit they would buy in case they make successful bids for both. Likewise, 
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before Kit 3 was offered, participants were asked to decide which kit they would buy in 
case of two or three successful bids.4  
The enumerators followed the same procedure for each kit. First, they 
demonstrated the kit. The enumerators had been trained beforehand by Dassy Enterprise 
to convey the key product information. Kit 1 and Kit 2 were demonstrated during the 
interview, while Kit 3 was too heavy to be taken to each household and was therefore 
only described in all details. Second, enumerators explained the BDM real purchase offer 
procedure. Respondents were instructed that they could purchase the product only if their 
bid exceeded or equaled the randomly drawn price. The price to be paid was the 
randomly drawn price, not the stated one. This price would be drawn in public in the 
afternoon.5 Moreover, it was explained that the household would not be allowed to 
purchase the product if its bid fell below the randomly selected price; in other words, 
changing the bid afterward was not possible. It was emphasized that the price was not 
negotiable; it could not be influenced in any manner by the enumerator or the household. 
Third, the randomly assigned payment period (one week, six weeks or five months) was 
announced. The interviewed households were then offered the solar kit and asked for the 
highest price they would be willing and able to pay.  
We opted for the BDM approach, because, unlike stated WTP approaches, it 
incentivizes truthful responses. If the bidder overstated her real reservation price, she 
would have to buy the product at a price higher than her actual valuation. In contrast, by 
understating her real reservation price, she might miss a purchase opportunity at a price 
that was less than or equal to her valuation. Another useful feature of BDM is that it 
allows for observing exact point-of-purchase prices, i.e., it allows for drawing a detailed 
demand curve. It hence yields more precise, higher-resolution data on households’ WTP 
as compared to take-it-or-leave-it approaches, which provide only WTP bounds. 
                                                 
4 This procedure ensures independence between bids. A downward bias due to bid dependence is very 
unlikely for two reasons. First, households were not aware of the Kit 2 (or 3) offer when bidding for Kit 1 
(or 2). Second, the capacity of the kits presented increases consecutively. A potential upward bias may still 
arise if households increased their bid more than they increased their actual valuation because they 
reasoned that the superior kit introduced next should have a higher price than the one formerly presented. 
However, theoretically, incentive compatibility of the BDM approach should prevent this. Note that only 
five households made inconsistent bids, i.e., higher bids were made for a smaller kit than for a larger one. 
5 Note that this price randomization on the village level does not require correct standard error estimates 
using bootstrapping or randomization inference, because the price draw is not the treatment as is the case in 
a standard RCT, i.e., we do not evaluate the effect of the price draw on behavior.  
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Furthermore, compared to a Vickrey second-price auction, the BDM set-up prevents 
collusion or conflict between different bidders during the bidding process, because they 
do not bid against each other, but against a random price draw.6 However, the BDM 
method is sometimes criticized for its complexity. In particular, in poor rural settings, the 
respondents’ comprehension can be a bottleneck. Therefore, before we offered the solar 
kits, we conducted a hypothetical practice round with a mobile phone without a real 
purchase.  
The households were informed that Dassy Enterprise’s field services would 
provide a one-year warranty. In this rural Rwandan context, warranties are uncommon, 
and signal good quality. The instructions the enumerators presented to the participants 
before the game furthermore contained some soft marketing messages (see Appendix A 
for the experiment instruction). The key features of the three kits were introduced, 
including the different electricity services they would allow for. Participating households 
were informed about average spending of rural Rwandan households on batteries, 
kerosene, and candles, i.e., those sources that can be replaced by the solar kit, using the 
information we collected during earlier surveys (see Lenz et al. 2017). We administered 
our socio-economic questionnaire only after the bidding processes for the three kits, in 
order to avoid distorting effects on the participants’ mind set or bidding behavior. 
Moreover, the participant was informed about the minimum and maximum prices 
in the draw. The lower bounds of these ranges were set at a very low price level of 
approximately 30 percent of the market prices for Kit 1 and Kit 2 and at 65 percent of the 
Kit 3 market price.7 The upper price bounds were the Rwandan market prices of the 
respective solar kit. The price range was disclosed to the participant because, based on 
preparatory field visits, we expected very low knowledge about actual prices in the rural 
population and figured that an entirely non-anchored WTP might even discourage 
participation.8 We chose this upper bound to be sufficiently high to cover the 
participants’ maximum WTP (which turned out to be true). The participants were simply 
informed once about the price ranges, without any further appeal to bid within this range 
(see again Appendix A). 
                                                 
6 See Berry et al. (2015) for a profound discussion of BDM. 
7 The price range was between 4 USD and 13 USD for Kit 1, 13 USD and 38 USD for Kit 2, and 115 USD 
and 182 USD for Kit 3.  
8 Answering a non-anchored WTP question can be cognitively very challenging (Kaas et al. 2006), 
particularly when participants are confronted with an unknown product. 
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After the household visits were completed, the random price draw for each solar 
kit was done openly in an afternoon community meeting in the presence of all 
participants. We decided to draw prices at the community level (i.e., one price per kit and 
community) instead of at the household level, in order to avoid social tensions induced by 
different prices within the same community.  
Those participants whose bids exceeded the drawn price received the product the 
same day and signed a binding sales contract. Beyond the contract, no sanctions in case 
of non-payment were announced. Participants were offered the possibility to make a 
voluntary advance payment. Remaining payments could be made in installments via 
mobile banking through one of the three Rwandan mobile phone operators.9 At the time 
of survey implementation, Dassy Enterprise and other Rwandan small solar kit providers 
did not offer payment schemes featuring remote monitoring to shut down the solar kit 
(see Sections 2.1. and 4.4.). All but two households were sufficiently familiar with 
mobile banking services. These two households had already opted out of the game during 
the interview. 
4. Results 
4.1. Summary Statistics and Balancing Test 
Table 2 summarizes the key socio-economic characteristics of our sample and 
tests whether the randomized payment period groups are balanced. The multiple t-tests 
show that the groups do not differ significantly. For those variables that do exhibit 
statistically significant differences, the magnitude of the difference is small. We will 
nonetheless control for all the variables in the subsequent evaluation of the randomized 
payment schemes.  
Around 13 percent of our sample (41 households) already possessed a solar kit. 
The majority of these households (63 percent) received their kit from urban areas, 
presumably from friends or relatives. In order to test whether respondents had 
preconceived price information, after the bidding game we asked them to guess the 
market prices of the three kits. This variable confirms that most of the solar kit-owning 
households received them at no cost, as only five out of the 41 households were able to 
name a price. Among the 88 percent of survey participants that did not yet possess a solar 
                                                 
9 The payment conditions were explicitly explained before conducting the BDM game.  
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kit, only 10 respondents said they had an idea of the market price. This suggests that 
information about solar kit prices is very limited in the surveyed communities. 
The WTP expressed by solar-kit-owning households in the bidding game is likely 
to convey a different message than the one expressed by households without a kit, 
because they bid for a second modern lighting source. The same might apply to 
households that already own a rechargeable lamp or a car battery; both are typically 
charged by the users in shops that have a generator or in the next grid covered 
communities. We therefore control for these electricity sources in our assessment later in 
this section.10  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Balancing Test for 
Randomized Payment Periods 
 
 
Mean full 
sample 
p-value  
Period 1 vs. Period 2 
p-value  
Period 1 vs. Period 3 
p-value  
Period 2 vs. Period  3 
Socio-economic characteristics     
 
Female respondent/bidder 0.42 0.472 0.829 0.347 
Head of HH years of education 4.44 0.439 0.399 0.117 
HH size 4.53 0.118 0.640 0.038* 
Head of HH is a farmer  0.80 0.780 0.471 0.650 
Share of students in HH 0.30 0.013* 0.632 0.037* 
 House with tile roofing 0.21 0.769 0.220 0.340 
 Monthly non-energy 
expenditures (USD) 1 
57.68 0.025* 0.081* 0.821 
Baseline energy consumption     
 Monthly phone charging 
expenditures (USD)1 
1.11 0.634 0.409 0.664 
 Monthly energy expenditures 
(USD)1,2 
8.71 0.059* 0.252 0.348 
 Owns rechargeable lamp 0.08 0.680 0.486 0.262 
 Owns car battery  0.02 0.052* 0.083* 0.767 
 Owns solar kit 0.13 0.238 0.845 0.324 
 N 324 218 211 219 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote statistical significance. 1 The values are bottom and top coded 
at 2% and 98% of the distribution respectively to eliminate outliers. 2 Including expenditures on kerosene, 
dry-cell batteries, and candles; we excluded expenditures for charcoal and firewood, since the services for 
which these fuels are used (cooking, ironing) are not replaceable by solar kits; for those 26 households that 
own a rechargeable lamp, we did not elicit expenditures for recharging the lamp.  
To get a sense of the net savings potential, we now consider the price of each kit 
in relation to the total energy expenditures that it can replace. This provides us with an 
                                                 
10 As a robustness check, we redo the WTP analysis for a restricted sample for which we exclude 
households that already own a solar kit or a car battery. Results can be found in Appendix B, Table B2. It 
shows that the results in the following sections are robust to the exclusion of these households. 
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estimate of the amortization period when only immediate monetary savings are taken into 
account. Because the smaller kits in particular will not replace these costs completely, we 
use a ‘replacement factor’ (RF, derived from Grimm et al. 2017) that approximates the 
share of expenditures on kerosene, dry-cell batteries, and candles to be effectively 
replaced by the solar kits. We assume that Kit 1 and 2 will replace approximately 75 
percent of lighting expenditures (see Table 3). Kit 2 further replaces 75 percent of radio 
and all phone charging expenditures. Kit 3 replaces all traditional energy sources in these 
categories. Based on these assumptions, Table 3 shows that the amortization periods for 
the three kits are on average 14, 17, and 68 months. Note that, according to the expected 
lifetime that Dassy communicates to customers, Kit 3, unlike Kit 1 and Kit 2, would on 
average amortize only after the end of its lifespan (see Section 3.1). 
Table 3. Savings Potential of Solar Kits 
Kit Average replaceable energy expenditures in USD on…* RF Total 
monthly 
savings 
(in USD) 
Amortization 
(in months)  
 …phone charging  …candles 
…batteries 
for lighting …kerosene for lighting 
…batteries 
for radio 
1 1.11 * 0.00 0.16 * 0.75 0.66 * 0.75 0.43* 0.75 
0.28 * 0.00 0.94 14 
2 1.11 * 1.00 0.16 * 0.75 0.66 * 0.75 0.43 * 0.75 
0.28 * 0.75 2.32 17 
3 1.11 * 1.00 0.16 * 1.00 0.66 * 1.00 0.43 * 1.00 
0.28 * 1.00 2.64 68 
Sources: Expenditures data from own data set. RF abbreviates replacement factor.  
4.2. Revealed Willingness to Pay in Bidding Game 
Virtually all visited households agreed to participate in at least one of the three 
bidding games (see Table 4). In total, 164 households won the bidding game, i.e., at least 
one bid exceeded the randomly drawn price (66 households for Kit 1, 88 for Kit 2 and 10 
for Kit 3). Only ten of these 164 winning households refused the purchase, either because 
they noticed afterward that they bid too high (four households) or, after the price 
drawing, they wanted a different kit than the one for which they successfully bid (six 
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households).11 Effectively, 154 households purchased a kit.12 As can be seen in Table 4, 
some households did not make a bid. The highest share of non-bidding is observed for 
Kit 3 (44 percent), whereas it is clearly below 10 percent for Kit 1 and 2. The dominating 
reason for non-bidding is that households were not willing or able to make a bid above 
the lower bound (remember that the range for the randomly determined prices was 
disclosed before the game).13 In order to avoid a potential bias because of this opting-out 
behavior, we estimate a Tobit model to account for the censored sample.  
The results of the bidding game can be found in Table 4, not yet accounting for 
the different payment schemes. We show both the WTP of those households that made a 
bid and the corrected WTP using the Tobit model. The average bid for Kit 1 across all 
treatment groups was roughly 5 USD, which is equivalent to 38 percent of the market 
price. The price bid for Kit 2 was slightly less than 17 USD, covering 45 percent of the 
market price. For Kit 3, the average bid was 97 USD, which covers 54 percent of the 
market price.14, 15 
                                                 
11 We asked respondents for their satisfaction with their bid after the community price drawing. The vast 
majority were satisfied with the bids. Only one bidder was unsatisfied because s/he bid too much and 12 
percent of bidders were unsatisfied because they bid too little. This latter reasoning implies either that these 
bidders bid below their valuation or that their valuation changed between bid and the price draw, for 
example, due to envy or social comparison. 
12 In total, 51 participants won two auctions. 43 bidders won the two smaller kits; of these bidders, the 
majority (39) had chosen beforehand to take Kit 2. Three participants won Kits 1 and 3; of these bidders, 
two picked Kit 1. Five participants won Kits 2 and 3, and four of them purchased Kit 3. In addition, eight 
participants won bids for all three kits. Most (5) had decided beforehand to buy Kit 2, whereas two 
participants chose Kit 1 and one participant chose Kit 3.  
13 More specifically, for Kit 1, all 13 participants who opted out claimed that the kit would not fulfill their 
needs, almost entirely because it does not charge phones. Similarly, half of the 26 respondents who opted 
out from bidding for Kit 2 claimed it would not fulfill their needs, while 35 percent cited a lack of financial 
resources, 12 percent already owned a kit, and two households did not want to use mobile money. For Kit 
3, 82 percent did not have the financial resources to bid and15 percent did not like it. One household said 
the payment period was too short. 
14 The WTP for the restricted sample, excluding those households that already possessed a solar kit or a car 
battery before our visit, shows that our results are robust. The WTP values are quite similar at 4.91 USD for 
Kit 1, 17.24 USD for Kit 2, and 94.51 USD for Kit 3.  
15 The corresponding WTP in the Lee et al. (2016) study is around 147 USD. Unlike our BDM approach, 
those authors used a take-it-or-leave it approach to elicit WTP, and observed adoption rates for four 
different price points on the demand curve. While the authors did not analyze the average WTP across the 
sample, the value corresponding to our average WTP can be obtained by dividing the fitted consumer 
surplus of 12,421 USD by the average community population of 84.7 households.  
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Table 4. Bidding Game Outcomes 
 Kit 1 Kit 2 Kit 3 
Respondent participates in bidding game 0.94 0.92 0.56 
Market price (USD) 13 36 182 
    
Bid amount, bidders only (USD)  4.92 16.84 93.84 
 (2.06) (7.16) (45.17) 
Bid amount full sample (USD, Tobit corrected)1 4.90 16.66 96.88 
 (2.01) (6.95) (34.60) 
Bid as share of total monthly expenditures1,2 18.86 58.36 294.84 
 (20.46) (57.82) (328.54) 
    
N Sales in experiment 66 88 10 
N contracts effectively signed 60 84 10 
Number of observations  324 324 324 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 1 Values are bottom and top coded at 2% and 98% of the 
distribution respectively to eliminate the effect of outliers. 2 Excluding expenditures on wood and 
rechargeable lamps.  
Figure 3 uses the households’ WTP to illustrate the demand curves for the three 
kits. The figure shows that the end-user prices at which full uptake would take place in 
our sample amount to less than 10 percent of the kits’ market prices, namely 1.3 USD for 
Kit 1, 3.9 USD for Kit 2, and 6.4 USD for Kit 3. 
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Figure 3. Demand for Solar Kits 
  
  
Note: Price in italics refers to price that would lead to 100 percent uptake. The demand curves are based on 
bids by households. For households that opted out of the bidding, we estimate values via a Tobit estimation 
(see Section 4.3). 
The distribution of bids displayed in Figure 3 suggests an anchoring effect due to 
the announcement of price ranges, in that the observable bids cumulate above the lower 
price bound for Kits 1 and 2. Two distortive effects can lead to this bidding behavior. 
First, as mentioned above, bids could be biased downwards if participants – in spite of 
the incentive-compatible BDM mechanism - gamble to get the kit at the lowest price. 
Second, bids could be biased upwards if participants with a real WTP slightly below the 
lower bound are tempted to adapt it to this lower bound. Even if we – conservatively – 
assume the estimates to be slightly biased downwards, it seems safe to conclude that, for 
the vast majority of households, the true willingness to pay is clearly below the market 
price. Only very few observations reach this upper bound.  
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Comparing the bids to the households’ total expenditures reveals the priority that 
modern lighting constitutes for people in rural areas (see Table 4). While the WTP for Kit 
1 already corresponds to almost 20 percent of people’s monthly expenditures, the 
increase of bids when phone charging services are added is especially striking. For Kit 2, 
the average WTP corresponds to 58 percent of the total monthly expenditures. For Kit 3 
the average bid corresponds to 295 percent of the bidders’ monthly expenditures. 
4.3. Effect of Liquidity Constraints 
In this section, we examine the causal effect of relaxing liquidity constraints on 
the bidder’s WTP. We regress the bidders’ WTP values for each of the three solar kits in 
a log-linear model on the randomized payment scheme and a set of socio-economic 
control variables. We again account for the censored samples by using a Tobit Model. 
For all three kits, we include community fixed effects and control for the date of the 
bidding game. The date might have an effect because the survey work was spread across 
three months and the later interviews were closer to Rwanda’s second harvest period in 
December. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. The results are shown in 
Table 5. We subsequently include the two sets of control variables already presented in 
Table 2, i.e., socio-economic characteristics and baseline energy consumption variables. 
The latter might be endogenous to the reported WTP, but they could as well be important 
covariates leading to an omitted variable bias if not accounted for. As we will see, the 
results turn out to be robust, so both potential biases are probably negligible.  
The effects of relaxing liquidity constraints are very consistent across the three 
kits. Offering a six-week payment period instead of a seven-day payment period 
increases the WTP, but the increase is small in size and not statistically significant. For 
all three kits, the five-month treatment increases the WTP by 7 to 12 percent and the 
increases are at least borderline statistically significant. Yet, the positive treatment effect 
vanishes when discounting the WTP for a 2.5 percent monthly interest rate applied to 
each of the two treatments (not shown in the table; see Section 5.1. for a discussion). 
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Table 5. Payment Periods and Willingness to Pay  
  Kit 1 Kit 2 Kit 3 
Payment periods                   
 Payment period: 6 weeks 0.013 0.014 0.021 0.059 0.061 0.062 0.067 0.060 0.065 
 
 (0.778) (0.774) (0.633) (0.372) (0.340) (0.311) (0.193) (0.240) (0.203) 
 Payment period: 5 months 0.112 0.118 0.106 0.100 0.102 0.081 0.073 0.085 0.067 
 
 (0.035)** (0.012)** (0.037)** (0.130) (0.108) (0.146) (0.149) (0.089)* (0.184) 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.126 0.179 0.159 0.144 0.204 0.236 0.186 0.266 0.206 
 Observations 324 323 324 324 323 324 324 323 324 
 Prob > chi2 0.035 0.010 0.073 0.319 0.271 0.351 0.281 0.210 0.300 
 Control variables included          
 Community and time YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Socio-economic characteristics NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
 Baseline lighting consumption NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Note: p-values are displayed in parentheses, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote statistical 
significance. The dependent variable is log(WTP). We display marginal effects from a Tobit estimation. 
The base category is a one week payment period. Table B.1 in the Appendix B shows the complete 
regression results including control variables. 
4.4. Default Rates 
This section explores the challenges in collecting instalment payments. These 
challenges are typical for many rural African markets and thereby constitute substantial 
transaction costs in disseminating market-based off-grid solar power to the rural poor. 
We used a PAYG model similar to that of many other providers, in which participants 
agreed to a contract to pay small instalments over time via mobile money.  
Only 17 percent of participants paid the full price on their own initiative and 
within their payment period. Participants were not reminded before this period expired. 
The share of full payments is highest, at 37 percent, in the one-week payment group 
compared to the six weeks (11 percent) and five months groups (9 percent). Figure C in 
the Appendix C graphically shows the payment behavior over time. Our field team 
started calling overdue participants only after the respective payment period had expired. 
The purchasers were reminded up to nine times over a period of six months. In total, 488 
reminder calls were made. The most typical response to these calls was a payment 
promise (over 50 percent), followed by referring to financial bottlenecks, sickness, and 
dissatisfaction with mobile money (about 10 percent each). It was never stated that non-
payment was due to quality issues or dissatisfaction with the kits. For participants in 
default, our field team eventually contacted community authorities and revisited the 
defaulting participants to announce that the kit would have to be returned in case of 
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further payment delays. This encashment process increased the rate of fully paid kits 
considerably, from 17 to 65 percent by September 2016, i.e., around 14 months after the 
experiment, which is a fairly high payment share and in line with comparable exercises 
(see Tarozzi et al. 2014).16  
It is true that novel PAYG features, for example, those that turn off the kit 
remotely in case of non-payment, are likely to improve the repayment behavior. Yet, we 
would argue that a major reason for the challenges that we experienced are affordability 
issues among the poor rural target group. While the specific numbers presented above are 
of course not transferable to other settings, the observation of a very challenging 
repayment processes probably is generalizable – at least if we postulate that the market 
reaches out to poorer strata, which is necessary to achieve the universal access goal. 
5. Interpretation of Results  
In this section, we interpret our findings in light of two perspectives. First, in the 
SE4All angle, we discuss the implications of our results for the market-based approach 
currently favored by the SE4All initiative and pursued by many governmental 
interventions. Second, in the Social Planner’s angle, we provide a back-of-the-envelope 
cost-benefit analysis of a full subsidization policy. 
5.1. Sustainable Energy for All Angle  
Households in our remote rural areas are on average willing to pay prices that 
cover only half of the current market prices, at most. It will hence be difficult to reach the 
very poor, and thus achieve universal access, with a solely market-driven approach. Yet, 
this low WTP clearly does not reflect a lack of interest, as signaled by an average WTP of 
295 percent of total monthly expenditures for Kit 3. This number indicates a high 
valuation of off-grid solar electricity relative to household income. Qualitative statements 
in open interviews also confirmed the importance of electricity for households, even if 
provided by off-grid solar rather than by grid connection.  
The effect of extended payment periods on WTP is between 7 and 12 percent for 
the five-month payment period. This increase has to be put in perspectives with interest 
                                                 
16 Compared to default rates in the micro-finance sector, ours are quite high. This comparison, however, is 
not too relevant to our case. A pivotal difference is that we approached a random sample of all households, 
whereas micro-finance loans are taken up by a self-selected and probably more solvent sample of 
households.  
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rates on local formal and informal capital markets. Savings and Credit Cooperative 
Organizations (SACCOs), the most accessible formal source of financing, offer credit in 
rural Rwanda at interest rates of 2.5 to 5 percent monthly (AFR, AMIR and 
MicroFinanza Rating 2015), which roughly corresponds to the increase in WTP. Hence, 
when we apply this interest rate to our zero-interest rate payment periods, the positive 
treatment effect on the WTP vanishes.   
It is worth noting that these high interest rates are also related to the low 
repayment rates that we observed. While the repayment rates described in Section 4.4 are 
specific to this scenario, we believe that our experience is an indicator of generally high 
transaction costs and default rates in rural areas. In a market-based approach, these 
transaction costs have to be borne by the companies and might easily become prohibitive.   
It might be that the payment schemes we offered are not long enough, especially 
for Kit 3. Poor households might be particularly interested in payment schemes that 
enable them to make the investment without changing their cash flow over time, which 
would require that the investment amortizes within the payment period. To assess this, 
the stylized calculations we performed in Table 3 are helpful. A payment period that 
enables households to invest in off-grid solar without changing their cash flow over time 
would have to be as long as the amortization periods of 14 months, 17 months, and 68 
months for Kit 1, 2, and 3, respectively. While the payment periods for Kit 1 and 2 could 
be realistic in real-world loans, a 68-month period probably is not. For the SE4ALL 
perspective, it is important to note that this amortization period is very heterogeneous 
across the expenditure distribution. This is because replaceable energy expenditures 
(mostly on kerosene and dry-cell batteries) vary considerably. For the highest expenditure 
quintile, the amortization period decreases to 9, 13, and 48 months. This reduction is 
considerable and hints at the success stories of M-Kopa and d.light, which target the non-
poor rural strata. For the poorest quintile, by contrast, the investment into the three 
devices pays off only after 18, 26 and 106 months, which indicates that payment periods 
have to be extended dramatically to allow the poor to invest without changing their 
expenditures over time.  
In sum, these considerations show that a purely market-driven approach is 
unlikely to reach broader sections of the population. The poor’s ability to pay is low and 
their amortization periods are particularly long. Moreover, as discussed in Section 4.4, 
transaction costs are high in such markets, which is also reflected in high interest rates in 
capital markets. 
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5.2. Social Planner’s Angle: A Stylized Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In this section, we assess the social cost-effectiveness of a full subsidization 
policy that reduces the end-user price to zero. We contrast the cost of this policy – 
approximated by the solar kits’ market prices - with its internalized benefits – 
approximated by the WTP. Since this WTP probably accounts only for internalized 
benefits, but not for external effects or long-term private benefits, we label the gap 
between cost and WTP the internal return on investment gap.17 For on-grid 
electrification in Kenya, Lee et al. (2016) estimate this gap to be between 511 USD and 
1,100 USD per household.18  
In order to approximate the cost of a full subsidization program, we use the prices 
charged by Rwandan last-mile distributors. It is plausible to assume that these prices 
cover all logistics and servicing network costs. We thereby abstract from additional 
administrative costs, but also from potential economies of scale.  
Table 6 shows the cost and benefits of our solar off-grid devices, as well as the 
resulting internal return on investment gap. In line with our observation in Section 4.2, it 
shows that the gap amounts to 8 USD per household for Kit 1, 21 USD for Kit 2, and 85 
USD for Kit 3. Hence, the average cost clearly exceeds average internalized benefits. 
However, this gap per household is much smaller than for on-grid electrification.  
Table 6. Cost and Direct Benefits of Off-grid Electricity Per Household 
 Kit 1 Kit 2 Kit 3 
Cost in USD 12.90 37.40 182.00 
Direct Benefits in USD (as reflected in WTP) 4.90 16.70 96.90 
Internal return on investment gap in USD 8.00 20.70 85.10 
Note: Tobit corrected WTP values are used; see Table 4.  
So far, this calculation ignores replacement investments that are required after the 
lifespan of the solar kits. Yet, even when accounting for replacement investments, our 
overall conclusion should hold. To illustrate this, a very conservative lifetime estimate of 
Kit 1 is at least three years, Kit 2 six years, and Kit 3 four years. Even if we assume 
                                                 
17 Lee et al. (2016) use the terms ‘welfare loss’ and ‘social costs’.  
18 Note that the household grid connection costs in Kenya are not extraordinarily high. For rural Rwanda, 
Lenz et al. (2017) report that grid connection cost in the extensive grid roll-out program EARP amounts to 
around 1,500 USD per household. Chaplin et al. (2017) observe a connection cost in Tanzania of 6,600 
USD per household. See as well World Bank (2009) for an overview on grid connection cost in Africa.    
Environment for Development Grimm et al. 
 
25 
replacing the solar kits after their respective lifetimes (i.e., a number of replacements over 
a 20-year period), the internal return on investment gap accumulates to 53 USD for Kit 1, 
69 USD for Kit 2, and 426 USD for Kit 3 and thus is still less than for on-grid 
electrification. Note that this is very likely a conservative assessment, as production costs 
of off-grid solar are constantly decreasing.   
Should the social planner hence invest in a full subsidy for the distribution of off-
grid solar? Leaving the normative SE4All goal aside, this would be the case as soon as 
the external effects and non-internalized private benefits are high enough to close the 
internal return on investment gap. Theoretically, there are three types of effects that are 
not covered in our WTP values. First, households do not account for external effects. 
These could be, for example, reductions in environmental damages from kerosene and 
battery use or positive spillovers to neighbors who seize the lighting, radio, or phone 
charging opportunity. There is no evidence on spillovers, but, as for environmental 
effects, quality-verified off-grid solar in particular can decrease e-waste in countries with 
poor waste management infrastructure (see Grimm et al. 2017; Grimm and Peters 2016; 
and Bensch et al. 2017).19 The impact on greenhouse gas emissions, in contrast, is 
probably small (see Baurzhan and Jenkins 2016). 
Second, households’ WTP might not reflect private benefits from solar kit usage 
that are unknown, uncertain, or that materialize only in the very long run. These include 
improved security, cleaner air and the related reduction in health hazards, as well as the 
improved studying and working conditions and their potential positive effects on future 
employment. Grimm et al. (2017) in Rwanda, Rom et al. (2016) in Kenya, and Samad et 
al. (2013) in India provide evidence for effects on productivity of housework activities, 
health, and study time of children, which, however, does not necessarily imply immediate 
increases of educational or economic development outcomes. Grimm et al. (2017) 
furthermore observe that off-grid solar considerably reduces the consumption of dry-cell 
batteries, which are increasingly used for lighting purposes at the baseline and largely 
disposed of inappropriately outdoors. Aevarsdottir et al. (2017) find exceptionally 
pronounced impacts of off-grid solar in Tanzania. They not only observe effects on direct 
outcomes such as expenditures and phone charging, but also on labor supply and income. 
Focusing on educational outcomes and health, Kudo et al. (2017a and 2017b) as well as 
                                                 
19 Calculating the comprehensive environmental balance for off-grid solar is non-trivial, since it heavily 
depends on the environmental cost of solar kit production as well as the battery content and disposal 
systems at production and consumption sites.  
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Furukawa (2014) also observe that off-grid solar is indeed used for studying purposes. 
Yet, in their trials in Bangladesh and Uganda, this does not translate into effects on 
ultimate school performance indicators or respiratory symptoms. 
Third, households might face liquidity constraints beyond those that are removed 
by our payment periods. There is not much evidence in the literature on the specific role 
of credit schemes. Collings and Munyehirwe (2016) evaluate a PAYG scheme in Rwanda 
and observe that mostly wealthy households make use of the financing scheme. Yoon et 
al. (2016) confirm our findings and observe only a very subtle effect of an extended 
payment period on the WTP.  
Hence, overall, while impact findings are heterogeneous, the literature tends to 
agree that off-grid solar improves living conditions and thus welfare, but transformative 
effects on socio-economic development are less likely. It is therefore difficult to provide 
an unequivocal conclusion on the desirability of subsidies for off-grid solar. However, 
combining the SE4All angle and the Social Planner’s angle suggests that – if the 
normative SE4All universal access goal is to be achieved by 2030 – off-grid solar seems 
to be more promising, since a larger part of the internal return on investment gap is 
covered by non-internalized benefits.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper has examined the revealed willingness to pay (WTP) of poor off-grid 
households in rural Rwanda for three different solar lighting technologies. We find that 
the WTP values are clearly below the market prices of the three offered kits. We have 
also analyzed the causal effect of randomized payment periods on the WTP and do not 
observe a positive effect as soon as typical rural interest rates are accounted for.  
It is very possible, though, that smarter and longer payment schemes work better 
to facilitate household investment in off-grid solar. For example, remote monitoring 
systems can bring down transaction costs considerably. Some off-grid solar companies, 
such as M-Kopa and d.light in Kenya, have already achieved successes in better-off 
market segments. However, our evidence suggests that even those modifications and 
innovations will not solve the affordability problem for the poorer strata, which is also 
confirmed by Collings and Munyehirwe (2016). Moreover, our WTP analysis for solar 
kits took a rather static perspective. As solar kits diffuse into the communities, peer 
effects and social learning are likely to affect WTP values.  
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The lesson that can be taken away from interpreting our findings within the 
SE4All angle is that a purely market-based approach is unlikely to reach the broader 
population in these areas. The vast majority are not able to pay cost-covering prices and 
relaxing credit constraints does not seem to be a panacea. The ambition of the United 
Nations’ initiative Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) to disseminate off-grid solar to 
the rural poor via unsubsidized markets might be overly optimistic.  
We acknowledge the limits of external validity associated with an experiment in 
one country, especially in light of the huge Rwandan electricity grid extension program, 
EARP. This program might affect grid electrification expectations, and hence reduce the 
WTP. Accordingly, the WTP could well be higher in countries with a less vibrant energy 
policy. Our affordability result, though, is also informed by our previous work on energy 
access in other countries (see Bensch et al. 2016 for a study on Burkina Faso, as well as 
Grimm and Peters 2016, and Peters and Sievert 2016 for a review of several countries). 
This synthesis will be transferable to many other regions in rural Africa, in particular to 
the large number of countries that are so far not on the radar of the off-grid solar 
business.  
Now, turning to the Social Planner’s angle, we have shown that the internal 
return on investment gap, i.e., the difference between the cost of electricity provision and 
the internalized benefits, is lower for solar off-grid electrification than for on-grid 
electrification. This is mainly due to the high investment costs of grid electrification. In 
terms of non-internalized benefits, the literature provides some evidence that off-grid 
solar does not create a massive socio-economic transformation, but positive pro-poor 
impacts are likely and noteworthy given the low investment cost. Although off-grid solar 
does not allow for any substantial commercial usage, it seems likely that external and 
non-internalized private benefits close larger parts of the internal return on investment 
gap than benefits of on-grid electrification do. Earlier research has also shown that 
electricity consumption levels even in grid-connected areas in Africa are very modest 
(see Chaplin et al. 2017; Lenz et al. 2017; and Peters et al. 2011). Such low consumption 
levels can well be met by off-grid solar. It is furthermore worth mentioning that the WTP 
values we measure are low in absolute terms but they are quite considerable in relation to 
households’ budgets, indicating that they give off-grid electricity priority over many 
other important goods. Hence, from a welfare planner’s perspective, this makes a case for 
a policy intervention to facilitate adoption.   
Bringing together the two angles, our findings suggest that a subsidization policy 
is necessary to reach the short-term normative SE4All universal access goal and seems 
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justifiable from a social planner’s perspective. For policy, a reasonable way forward 
could therefore be to facilitate access to off-grid solar technologies for rural households 
in Africa, not only via indirect promotion policies like tax cuts and supply side 
interventions, but also through direct subsidies to decrease end-user prices. Such a 
subsidy scheme should encompass sustainable funding, pro-poor targeting, and a clearly 
communicated phasing-out strategy. Moreover, off-grid solar does not replace the 
necessity to build infrastructure. However, instead of rolling out the grid to every rural 
village in Africa, on-grid investments could be concentrated in certain thriving rural 
regions with high business potential or in industrial zones to which firms might relocate. 
Such an integrated on-grid, off-grid strategy would enable industrial development and at 
the same time achieve broad access to electricity at relatively low cost. 
 
 
 
 
  
Environment for Development Grimm et al. 
 
29 
References 
Aevarsdottir, A.M., N. Barton, and T. Bold. 2017. The Impacts of Rural Electrification 
on Labor Supply, Income and Health: Experimental Evidence with Solar Lamps 
in Tanzania. Unpublished Manuscript, June 2017.  
AFR, AMIR & MicroFinanza Rating. 2015. Assessment of the Rwandan Microfinance 
Sector Performance. Available online at http://www.afr.rw/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Rwanda-MF-Sector-Assessment-October-2015.pdf 
(Accessed June 13, 2016). 
Bates, M.A., R. Glennerster, K. Gumede, and E. Duflo. 2012. The Price is Wrong. Field 
Actions Science Reports (FACTS), Special Issue 4. 
Baurzhan, S., and G.P. Jenkins. 2016. Off-grid Solar PV: Is It an Affordable or 
Appropriate Solution for Rural Electrification in Sub-Saharan African Countries? 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 60: 1405-1418. 
Beltramo, T., G. Blalock, D.I. Levine, and A.M. Simons. 2015. The Effect of Marketing 
Messages and Payment over Time on Willingness to Pay for Fuel-efficient 
Cookstoves. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 118: 333-345. 
Bensch, G., M. Grimm, M. Huppertz, J. Langbein, and J. Peters. 2016. Are Promotion 
Programs Needed to Establish Off-grid Solar Energy Markets? Evidence from 
Rural Burkina Faso. Ruhr Economic Papers No. 653.  
Bensch, G., J. Peters, and M. Sievert. 2017. The Lighting Transition in Rural Africa –
From Kerosene to Battery-powered LED and the Emerging Disposal Problem. 
Energy for Sustainable Development 39: 13-20. 
Bernard, T. 2012. Impact Analysis of Rural Electrification Projects in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. World Bank Research Observer 27(1): 33-51. 
Berry, J., G.R. Fischer, and R. Guiteras. 2015. Eliciting and Utilizing Willingness to Pay: 
Evidence from Field Trials in Northern Ghana. Unpublished manuscript. 
Chaplin, D., A. Mamun, A. Protik, J. Schurrer, D. Vohra, K. Bos, H. Burak, L. Meyer, A. 
Dumitrescu, C. Ksoll, and T. Cook. 2017. Grid Electricity Expansion in Tanzania 
by MCC: Findings from a Rigorous Impact Evaluation. Report Submitted to the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation. Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy 
Research. 
 
Environment for Development Grimm et al. 
 
30 
Cohen, J., and P. Dupas. 2010. Free Distribution or Cost-sharing? Evidence from a 
Malaria Prevention Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(1): 1-45. 
Collings, S., and A. Munyehirwe. 2016. Pay-as-you-go Solar PV in Rwanda: Evidence of 
Benefits to Users and Issues of Affordability. Field Actions Science Reports 15: 
94-103. 
Devoto, F., E. Duflo, P. Dupas, W. Parienté, and V. Pons. 2012. Happiness on Tap: Piped 
Water Adoption in Urban Morocco. American Economic Journal: Economic 
Policy 4(4): 68-99. 
Dinkelman, T. 2011. The Effects of Rural Electrification on Employment: New Evidence 
from South Africa. The American Economic Review 101(7): 3078-3108. 
Dupas, P. 2014. Short‐run Subsidies and Long‐ run Adoption of New Health P roducts: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment. Econometrica 82(1): 197-228. 
Furukawa, C. 2014. Do Solar Lamps Help Children Study? Contrary Evidence from a 
Pilot Study in Uganda. Journal of Development Studies 50(2): 319-341. 
Grimm, M., and J. Peters. 2016. Solar Off-grid Markets in Africa: Recent Dynamics and 
the Role of Branded Products. Field Actions Science Reports (15): 160-163. 
Grimm, M., A. Munyehirwe, J. Peters, and M. Sievert. 2017. A First Step Up the Energy 
Ladder? Low Cost Solar Kits and Household's Welfare in Rural Rwanda. World 
Bank Economic Review 31(3): 631–649. 
IEA. 2011. World Energy Outlook 2011. Paris. 
Kaas, K.P., and H. Ruprecht. 2006. Are the Vickrey Auction and the BDM-mechanism 
Really Incentive Compatible. Schmalenbach Business Review 58: 37-55.  
Khandker, S.R., D.F. Barnes, and H.A. Samad. 2013. Welfare Impacts of Rural 
Electrification: A Panel Data Analysis from Vietnam. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 61(3): 659-692. 
Kremer, M., and E. Miguel. 2007. The Illusion of Sustainability. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 122(3): 1007-1065. 
Kudo, Y., A.S. Shonchoy, and K. Takahashi. 2017a. Can Solar Lanterns Improve Youth 
Academic Performance? Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh. World Bank 
Economic Review lhw073. 
Environment for Development Grimm et al. 
 
31 
Kudo, Y., A.S. Shonchoy, and K. Takahashi. 2017b. Short-term Impacts of Solar 
Lanterns on Child Health: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh (No. 646). 
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). 
Lee, K., E. Miguel, and C. Wolfram. 2016. Experimental Evidence on the Demand for 
and Costs of Rural Electrification (No. w22292). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Lenz, L., A. Munyehirwe, J. Peters, and M. Sievert. 2017. Does Large Scale 
Infrastructure Investment Alleviate Poverty? Impacts of Rwanda's Electricity 
Access Roll-out Program. World Development 89: 88-110. 
Lighting Global. 2016. Off-grid Solar Market Trends Report 2016. Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance and Lighting Global in cooperation with the Global Off-Grid 
Lighting Association (GOGLA). 
Lipscomb, M., A.M. Mobarak, and T. Barham. 2013. Development Effects of 
Electrification: Evidence from Topographic Placement of Hydropower Plants in 
Brazil. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(2): 200-231.  
MININFRA. 2016. Rural Electrification Strategy. April 2016. Ministry of Infrastructure, 
Republic of Rwanda. Kigali. 
Mobarak, A.M., P. Dwivedi, R. Bailis, L. Hildemann, and G. Miller. 2012. Low Demand 
for Nontraditional Cookstove Technologies. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 109(27): 10815-10820. 
NISR. 2008. District Baseline Survey. Available online at 
http://www.statistics.gov.rw/survey/districts-baseline-survey (Accessed August, 
4, 2017). 
Peters, J., C. Vance, and M. Harsdorff. 2011. Grid Extension in Rural Benin: Micro-
manufacturers and the Electrification Trap. World Development 39(5): 773-783. 
Peters, J., and M. Sievert. 2016. Impacts of Rural Electrification Revisited: The African 
Context. Journal of Development Effectiveness 8(3): 327-345. 
Rom, A., I. Günther, and K. Harrison. 2016. Economic Impact of Solar Lighting: A 
Randomized Field Experiment in Kenya. Version v1, December 2016. 
Rud, J.P. 2012. Electricity Provision and Industrial Development: Evidence from India. 
Journal of Development Economics 97(2): 352-367. 
Environment for Development Grimm et al. 
 
32 
Samad, H.A., S.R. Khandker, M. Asaduzzaman, and M. Yunus. 2013. The Benefits of 
Solar Home Systems: An Analysis from Bangladesh. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper #6724. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All). 2013. Sustainable Energy for All Global Tracking 
Framework Consultation Document. Available online at 
http://www.se4all.org/tracking-progress/ (Accessed October 12, 2016). 
Sustainable Energy for All. 2014. Rapid Assessment Gap Analysis Rwanda. Available 
online at http://www.se4all.org/content/rwanda (Accessed October 12, 2016). 
Tarozzi, A., A. Mahajan, B. Blackburn, D. Kopf, L. Krishnan, and J. Yoong. 2014. 
Micro-loans, Insecticide-treated Bednets, and Malaria: Evidence from a 
Randomized Controlled Trial in Orissa, India. American Economic Review 
104(7): 1909-1941. 
van de Walle, D., M. Ravallion, V. Mendiratta, and G. Koolwal. 2016. Long-term Gains 
from Electrification in Rural India. World Bank Economic Review, forthcoming. 
World Bank. 2009. Unit Costs of Infrastructure Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. Background Paper (11). 
World Development Indicators. 2014. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators (Accessed July 29, 2016). 
Yishay, A.B., A. Fraker, R.P. Guiteras, G. Palloni, N.B. Shah, S. Shirrell, and P. Wang. 
2016. Microcredit and Willingness to Pay for Environmental Quality: Evidence 
from a Randomized-controlled Trial of Finance for Sanitation in Rural Cambodia. 
Maryland Population Research Center. 
Yoon, S., J. Urpelainen, and M. Kandlikar. 2016. Willingness to Pay for Solar Lanterns: 
Does the Trial Period Play a Role? Review of Policy Research 33(3): 291-315. 
 
 
 
 
  
Environment for Development Grimm et al. 
 
33 
Appendix A. Experiment Instruction  
I now invite you to buy the kit which I just presented to you. The sale is 
different from usual sales, as the price is not yet fixed. The sale works as follows. You 
will make a bid for the kit, which means you tell me the exact price you are willing to 
pay for it. It is good for you to indicate the maximum price you are willing to pay. 
When you make your bid, remember that you spend a certain amount of money every 
month on energy to light your house, for example on batteries, candles or kerosene. For 
all these energy sources, people in rural Rwanda spent on average 2,600 RWF per 
month. You could hence save this money if you buy the kit. After you made your bid, I 
will draw a price from this envelope during a village meeting this afternoon [show 
envelope]. There are different prices written on pieces of paper in this envelope. The 
smallest price is 3,000 RWF (10,000 RWF, 90,000 RWF) and the highest is 10,000 
RWF (30,000 RWF, 140,000).  
If the price you offer now is lower than the price I draw, you cannot buy the kit. 
If the price you offer now is higher than the price I draw, you can buy the kit for the 
price I draw. You only have the option to bid once and you cannot change your bid 
afterwards. Hence, if your bid is lower than the price I draw, you cannot buy the kit.  
After the price drawing in the village meeting, you will have to sign a purchase 
contract if you won the price drawing. If you cannot pay immediately, you have 7 days 
(6 weeks, 5 months) to pay for the kit in installments via mobile money. If you want to, 
you can make an advance payment today. Hence, please make a bid which you are able 
to pay within 7 days (6 weeks, 5 months). 
We will not inform the others about the price you offer to pay. In addition, the 
result of the price drawing will remain confidential.  
I will now give you an example, such that you can better understand the sale 
process. Imagine I offered you a mobile phone with the same rules. You could for 
example say that you are ready to pay 3,000 RWF for this phone. Then we draw a price 
from an envelope.  
 
- The price we draw from the envelope could for example be 2,000 RWF. What 
would happen in this case? [Wait for the answer. The correct answer is: I would 
buy the phone for 2,000 RWF] 
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- What would happen if you offer 3,000 RWF and the price we draw from the 
envelope is 3,500 RWF? [Wait for the answer. The correct answer is: I cannot 
buy the phone. Explain again in your own words if necessary, ask for questions, 
and give another hypothetical example with an imaginary product (not a solar 
kit) if necessary.]  
 
Remember that you can cannot change the price you offer after the price 
drawing from the envelope. This means, you can only make one bid. Also, remember 
that you have to pay the price in 7 days (6 weeks, 5 months). In addition, be aware that 
you cannot buy the kit, even if your offer is only a little bit less than the price I draw. 
[Verify whether there are still questions. Ask for the bid and assure yourself that the 
participant is convinced of it].  
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Appendix B. Regression Results    
Table B.1. Detailed Regression Results of Table 5 
  Kit1 Kit 2 Kit 3 
Payment periods            
Payment period: 6 weeks 0.013 0.014 0.021 0.059 0.061 0.062 0.067 0.060 0.065 
  (0.778) (0.774) (0.633) (0.372) (0.340) (0.311) (0.193) (0.240) (0.203) 
Payment period: 5 months 0.112 0.118 0.106 0.100 0.102 0.081 0.073 0.085 0.067 
  (0.035)** (0.012)** (0.037)** (0.130) (0.108) (0.146) (0.149) (0.089)* (0.184) 
Socio-economic characteristics  
         
  
Female respondent 
 
-0.028   
 
-0.084   
 
-0.054  
   (0.517)    (0.031)**    (0.060)* 
 
Hoh years of education 
 
0.015   
 
0.015   
 
0.007  
   (0.029)**    (0.002)***    (0.122) 
 
HH size 
 
-0.022   
 
-0.016   
 
-0.002  
   (0.082)*    (0.287)    (0.843) 
 
Hoh is a farmer 
 
0.059   
 
-0.036   
 
0.034  
   (0.130)    (0.346)    (0.478) 
 
Share of students in HH 
 
0.001   
 
-0.000   
 
0.001  
   (0.311)    (0.958)    (0.045)** 
 
House with tile roofing 
 
0.209   
 
0.078   
 
0.052  
   (0.117)    (0.417)    (0.469) 
 
Monthly non-energy expenditures (USD) 1,2 
 
0.000   
 
0.001   
 
-0.000  
   (0.737)    (0.126)    (0.696) 
 
Baseline energy consumption  
           
Monthly phone charging expenditures (USD)1 
  0.016   0.071   0.013 
    (0.341)   (0.000)***   (0.151) 
Monthly energy expenditures (USD)1,3 
  -0.001   0.000   -0.000 
    (0.141)   (0.726)   (0.922) 
Ownership of rechargeable lamp  
  0.132   0.062   0.048 
    (0.028)**   (0.353)   (0.218) 
             
Pseudo R-squared  0.126 0.179 0.159 0.144 0.204 0.236 0.186 0.266 0.206 
Observations 324 323 324 324 323 324 324 323 324 
Note: p-values are displayed in parentheses, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote statistical significance. 
The dependent variable is log(WTP). We display marginal effects from a Tobit estimation. We control for 
community and time fixed effects. Dummy variables taking the value 1 are indicated by “= 1”. 1 The values are 
bottom and top coded at 2% and 98% of the distribution respectively to eliminate the effect of outliers. 2 Excluding 
energy and phone charging expenditures. 3 Including expenditures on kerosene, gas, batteries, candles and charcoal; 
excluding expenditures on wood and rechargeable lamp charging. 
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Table B.2. Detailed Regression Results of Table 5 for Restricted Sample 
 Kit1 Kit 2 Kit 3 
Payment periods          
Payment period: 6 weeks 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.054 0.060 0.048 0.069 0.069 0.064 
 
(0.679) (0.720) (0.722) (0.469) (0.420) (0.478) (0.169) (0.162) (0.204) 
Payment period: 5 months 0.110 0.111 0.108 0.111 0.108 0.093 0.081 0.090 0.072 
 
(0.067)* (0.026)** (0.058)* (0.120) (0.129) (0.127) (0.087)* (0.050)** (0.115) 
Socio-economic characteristics  
      
  
Female respondent -0.055   -0.105   -0.041  
 
 (0.236)   (0.021)**   (0.174)  
Hoh years of education 0.015   0.018   0.007  
 
 (0.014)**   (0.001)***   (0.055)*  
HH size  -0.033   -0.022   0.005  
 
 (0.011)**   (0.141)   (0.593)  
Hoh is a farmer  0.059   -0.061   0.074  
 
 (0.136)   (0.143)   (0.138)  
Share of students in HH 0.002   0.000   0.000  
 
 (0.126)   (0.742)   (0.476)  
House with tile roofing 0.211   0.069   0.057  
 
 (0.075)*   (0.504)   (0.469)  
Monthly non-energy expenditures (USD) 1,2 0.000   0.000   -0.000  
 
 (0.758)   (0.323)   (0.877)  
Baseline energy consumption  
        
Monthly phone charging expenditures (USD)1  0.007   0.063   0.016 
  
 (0.650)   (0.000)***   (0.104) 
Monthly energy expenditures (USD)1,3  -0.001   0.000   0.000 
  
 (0.203)   (0.340)   (0.625) 
Ownership of rechargeable lamp   0.122   0.122   0.059 
  
 (0.068)*   (0.210)   (0.180) 
          
Pseudo R-squared  0.146 0.215 0.179 0.157 0.233 0.22 0.198 0.283 0.231 
Observations 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
Note: p-values are displayed in parentheses, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote statistical 
significance. The sample is restricted to households that do not own a modern electricity source, i.e., a car 
battery or a solar kit. The dependent variable is log(WTP). We display marginal effects from a Tobit 
estimation. We control for community and time fixed effects. Dummy variables taking the value 1 are 
indicated by “= 1”. 1 The values are bottom and top coded at 2% and 98% of the distribution respectively to 
eliminate the effect of outliers. 2 Excluding energy and phone charging expenditures.  3 Including 
expenditures on kerosene, gas, batteries, candles and charcoal; excluding expenditures on wood and 
rechargeable lamp charging.  
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Appendix C. Payment Behavior over Time     
Figure C. Payment Receipts over Time 
 
  
 Note: N denotes number of sales. 
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